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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                        
No.  05-4385
                        
CAROL J. BELAS,
               Appellant
 v.
JUNIATA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
THOMAS E. MUIR, individually, 
and in his capacity as Superintendent
of the Juniata County School District
                         
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No.  04-cv-00505)
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane
                        
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 25, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed:   October 18, 2006)
                        
OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Carol Belas appeals the grant of summary judgment by the
District Court in favor of defendants.  We will affirm the grant of summary judgment
2substantially for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its well-reasoned and
detailed Memorandum and Order, dated August 26, 2005.
I.
Belas became principal of the Monroe, Susquehanna, and Thompsontown -
Delaware Elementary Schools in August, 2001.   Evidence was offered in support of
defendants’ summary judgment motion that soon after her hiring Belas engaged in a
pattern of inappropriate behavior.  Among other infractions, she failed to secure
confidential student files, harassed staff members, violated written directives issued by
the superintendent, and in general failed to conduct herself as principal with any modicum
of professionalism or competence.  After several warnings, written reprimands, and
disciplinary conferences with superintendent Thomas Muir of the Juniata County School
District, Belas was suspended without pay for three days.  The pattern continued
unabated, however, and Belas received four more reprimands, two in March 2002 and
two in May 2002.  In June of 2002, Muir sought Belas’s termination by the School Board. 
After protracted hearings in which Belas was represented by counsel, the Board
voted to terminate her employment.  Belas appealed the decision to the Pennsylvania
State Department of Education.  In a 42-page opinion, the Secretary of Education rejected
the appeal.  Belas appealed that determination but also filed a separate action against
Muir and the School Board in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania claiming that her firing deprived her of her constitutional right to due
process.  Her state appeal is still pending, but defendants do not claim that Belas’s federal
3action is barred by the unexhausted state proceeding.  See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107,
116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In order to state a claim for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff
must have taken advantage of the processes that are available to him or her, unless those
processes are unavailable or patently inadequate.”); McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 460
(3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] discharged employee cannot claim in federal court that he has been
denied due process because his pretermination hearing was held by a biased individual
where he has not taken advantage of his right to a post-deprivation hearing before an
impartial tribunal that can rectify any possible wrong committed by the initial
decisionmaker.”).
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all five
claims brought by the plaintiff, including her due process claims and other claims not
appealed to this Court.  Plaintiff-Appellant appeals the entry of summary judgment on
two of those claims: a claim that her suspension without pay violated due process, and a
claim that her termination proceedings (including her appeal to the Secretary) violated
due process.
II.
We review the entry of summary judgment by applying the same standard the
lower court applied.  Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 194
(3d Cir. 2002).  Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
4entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  
To begin with the most recent proceeding, Belas attacks the decision by the
Secretary, claiming that the decision to review the record of the proceedings before the
School Board without additional live testimony violated due process.  We agree with the
District Court that Belas cites no case or regulation which requires that the Secretary
consider additional live testimony, and that Belas retains an opportunity to challenge the
Secretary’s determination in her state appeal.
Second, Belas attacks the process which ultimately led to her firing.  She claims
that it was unconstitutional for the Board to limit proposed findings of fact to ten pages
(she submitted no proposed findings of fact); that the Board relied on hearsay; that she
did not receive documents from the Board until it was time to begin her case; and that she
was not provided with a bill of particulars setting forth in greater detail the 20 page
document containing the charges against her.  For substantially the reasons provided by
the District Court, we agree these claims are spurious and present no genuine issues of
material fact.
Finally, Belas attacks her suspension.  A wrongful suspension without pay may
raise due process concerns.  Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241, 244 (3d Cir.
1986). Muir suspended Belas without pay on June 26, 2002, a status that continued until
she was terminated.  Belas claims that she was never granted a hearing on her suspension
during the 18 months that her case was being examined by the Board.  
The Supreme Court has described the “root requirement” of the Due Process
5Clause as being “that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest.”  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379
(1971).  As the District Court noted, immediately prior to suspending Belas, Muir met
with her and informed her of what was about to happen.  He provided her a written
memorandum outlining the reasons for her suspension and for her impending termination
proceeding.  Belas objected to the suspension but Muir was unmoved.  Belas claims that
Muir was biased, and accordingly the process afforded her was not meaningful and
therefore inadequate under the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 
We have held that the existence of a neutral, post-deprivation arbiter obviates the
need for the “excessive pretermination precaution” of requiring pre-deprivation hearings
to be conducted by unbiased or unconnected individuals.  Here, as noted above, the
relevant deprivation occurred when Belas was suspended without pay.  As we wrote in
McDaniels v. Flick, “[u]sually, an employment termination decision is made initially by
the employee’s direct supervisor . . . a sensible approach given that such person often is
already familiar with the employee’s abilities and shortcomings as well as the needs and
interests of the employer organization. Yet, these individuals are also likely targets for
claims of bias or improper motive simply because of their positions.”  59 F.3d at 460.  We
held that due process did not require that pre-deprivation hearings be conducted by
persons with no history with the complaining individual.  “On the whole, we do not think
that such excessive pretermination precaution is necessary where the state provides a
neutral tribunal at the post-termination stage that can resolve charges of improper
6motives.”  Id.  As discussed, that tribunal was and is available and as such Belas’s
suspension claim must fail.
For these reasons and reasons set forth by the District Court, the order of the
District Court will be affirmed.
